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Abstract
We run an experiment designed to elicit preferences over state contingent,
timed payouts. We analyze the data using a new revealed preference method
(building on Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017)) that can test for consistency with
utility functions that increase with a given preorder. Using this approach, we find
strong evidence of correlation averse behavior, a property ruled out by discounted
expected utility. There is also evidence in favor of stochastic impatience.
Keywords: correlation aversion, temporal risk aversion, discounted expected
utility, stochastic impatience, nonparametric methods
1 Introduction
I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the
battle to the strong . . . but time and chance happeneth to them all.
(Ecclesiastes 9:11)1
As the writer of Ecclesiastes acknowledges, time and risk are abiding features of human
existence. And yet easy answers are in short supply when modeling decision making
where time and risk are involved. The simplest approach, discounted expected utility
(DEU) is widely-acknowledged to be too restrictive for many purposes, yet exactly how
DEU should be relaxed is not fully resolved.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we contribute to the understanding
of behavior under time and risk by conducting and analyzing the results of an experiment
where participants make investment decisions over risky assets that pay out on different
dates. Our analysis convincingly rejects a property of preferences called correlation
1This passage from the King James version of the Bible was given a translation by George Orwell
into what he called “modern English of the worst sort”: “Objective considerations of contemporary
phenomena compel the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency
to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must
invariably be taken into account.”
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neutrality, which is a major consequence of the canonical DEU model; instead, we find
evidence in favor of correlation aversion and also of stochastic impatience.
Our analysis is carried out with a new toolkit of techniques from the revealed pref-
erence literature, by operationalizing the results in Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017).
These techniques, which are potentially applicable to other choice environments, al-
low us to test various structural properties of a subject’s preference, without imposing
functional form assumptions. Thus this paper also makes a second, methodological,
contribution to the use of revealed preference techniques in empirical research.
1.1 The Experimental Setup
We task 103 subjects with making 41 different decisions. Each decision involves spending
100 tokens to purchase quantities of four different assets. There are two equally likely
states (call them state 1 and state 2) and each of the four assets delivers a payout in
only one of the two states and at one of two dates. Thus, each asset in our experiment is
characterized by a pair (s, t) where s ∈ {1, 2} represents the state of the world in which
the asset pays out money and t ∈ {1, 2} represents the time of payment (1 being earlier
and 2 being later). We vary the prices of the assets, giving rise to 41 decision problems.
How participants choose in these decisions convey information on their preferences.
For example, a participant may allocate their entire budget to the asset with the highest
payout, which would signal extreme risk neutrality. At another extreme, a participant
may purchase the same amount of each asset, thus ensuring the same payout in each
state and at each time period. Importantly, the participant may also signal their level of
aversion to risks correlated across time. For example, a participant who purchases many
units of an asset which pays out in state 1 period 1 shall perhaps prefer to purchase the
asset which pays out in state 2 period 2 when compared to the asset which pays out in
state 1 period 2. In this way the participant may signal their desire for or aversion to
payouts correlated over time.
In many experiments, subjects are asked which of two options they prefer. By chang-
ing the options offered the researcher gets a sense of the preferences of the participant.
In contrast, subjects choose from a linear budget set in our experiment; an early example
of this type of experiment appears in Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007) where risk
preferences are explored.2 Besides its resemblance to ‘real life’ decision-making, bud-
getary decisions have the advantage that they convey information efficiently, in the sense
that the choice of one bundle from a budget means that it is preferred to an infinite set
2Linear budgets are also used to investigate risk preferences experimentally in Choi, Kariv, Wieland,
and Silverman (2014), Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014), Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018), and time
preferences in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
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of alternatives. The richer information makes it possible for the researcher to estimate
each participant’s preference separately (in other words, allowing for full heterogeneity)
and to test a large number of hypotheses about a participant’s preference (beginning
with whether or not the participant is maximizing some utility function, and going on
to various restrictions on its structure). Since the experimental setting is common to all
hypotheses tested it also facilitates comparisons among them.
1.2 Revealed Preference Analysis
We analyze the data with a revealed preference approach. The canonical result of Afriat
(1967) (see also Afriat (1972)) provides a simple non-parametric test for the hypothesis
that a dataset of budgetary choices is generated by a utility-maximizing agent. The
test is non-parametric in the sense that there are no functional form restrictions on
the utility function and it is merely required to be increasing (more is better). The
outcome of the test is a number e ∈ [0, 1], referred to as the critical cost efficiency index
(or just the efficiency level for short), which represents the goodness-of-fit of the utility
maximization hypothesis. A value of 1 corresponds to a perfect fit, wherein the data
could be exactly generated by utility maximization. If e is less than 1 then we may
conclude that if the dataset was generated by a utility maximizer, then this agent must,
at some observations, waste a fraction 1 − e of their budget set, in the sense that the
same utility can be achieved by spending a fraction e of the actual amount spent. An
agent with a high e is close to being consistent with utility maximization.
In this paper we are interested in testing if the choices from a participant in the ex-
periment could have come about as the result of maximizing a utility function satisfying
some additional property P. To implement tests of this type we exploit an extension
of Afriat’s Theorem found in Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017) (henceforth NOQ). Not
every property P is covered by the NOQ approach, but – crucially – it does cover some of
the core properties we care about, such as correlation aversion, impatience, and stochas-
tic impatience. For example, we can calculate the efficiency level at which a participant
is consistent with (basic) utility maximization and also the efficiency level at which
the participant is consistent with the maximization of a utility function that satisfies
impatience. (By definition the latter will be weakly lower than the former.)
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1.3 The Results
The DEUmodel assumes that a temporal sequence of random variablesX = (X0, . . . , XT )
representing monetary payouts is valued by a utility function of the form
U(X) = E
[
T∑
t=1
δtu(X t)
]
(1)
for some increasing function u : R+ → R. The first application of our methodology
imposes two (we believe) uncontroversial properties on to the utility function; termed
lottery equivalence and impatience. Both properties are implied by the DEU model.
Lottery equivalence says that the agent only cares about the distribution of pay-
outs and not the names of the states in which payouts occur. Concretely it says that
assets which pay out in state 1 are just as good as assets which pay out in state 2.
Impatience is the familiar preference for sooner payouts compared to later. This first
exercise may be thought of as a basic sense check of our data and methodology. While
it should be unsurprising to confirm these properties we view these first exercises as
an important way of ensuring that participants were not pushed beyond their cognitive
capacities by the experiment. If we could find little evidence in support of these two
uncontroversial properties then it would make us doubt if we could draw meaningful
conclusions concerning less established properties. Thankfully, we find strong evidence
that the participants in the experiment are utility maximizers satisfying these two prop-
erties. In particular we find that almost 80% of the participants act as though they are
maximizing utility functions satisfying lottery equivalence and impatience at the 0.95
efficiency level. That is, they never waste more than 5% of their budgets.
We next test whether participants satisfy the property of correlation neutrality,
another property implied by DEU. Correlation neutrality means that agents are indiffer-
ent to changes in the correlation between payouts received at different time periods. To
illustrate let us compare the following gambles where, as in our experiment, we assume
there are two equiprobable states. Gamble 1 pays out $1 in period 1 and $1 in period
2 should state state 1 occur and pays out nothing should state 2 occur. Gamble 2 pays
out $1 in period 1 and $0 in period 2 should state 1 occur while it pays out $0 in period
1 and $1 in period 2 should state 2 occur. With Gamble 1 a nice payout sooner is
accompanied by a nice payout later. On the other hand with Gamble 2 a good payout
sooner is accompanied by a bad payout later. Under correlation neutrality a person is
indifferent between Gamble 1 and Gamble 2. Correlation aversion is the preference
for payouts across time to be negatively correlated and so a correlation averse agent
prefers Gamble 2 to Gamble 1. It is straightforward to see that the DEU formula (1)
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satisfies correlation neutrality.3
We find strong evidence that participants do not display correlation neutral-
ity and instead display correlation aversion. We find that a mere 22.3% of our
participants have efficiency levels in excess of 0.95 when assuming their preferences ex-
hibit correlation neutrality. What this means is that if one wishes to insist that our
participants truly exhibit correlation neutrality then one must be willing to accept that
more than 75% of our participants routinely waste more than 5% of their budget. In
contrast, if we impose lottery equivalence, impatience, and correlation aversion then we
find that more than 75% of our participants have an efficiency level in excess of 0.95.
A second application of our revealed preference methods finds evidence in favor
of stochastic impatience. We believe the present study is the first to test for this
property. We again illustrate this property by comparing two gambles. Gamble 3 pays
out either 2 dollars in period 1 or 1 dollar in period 2 each with 50% probability.
Gamble 4 pays out either 1 dollar in period 1 or 2 dollars in period 2 each with 50%
probability. The stochastically impatient agent prefers Gamble 3 to Gamble 4. That
is, the agent prefers to have a chance of receiving the good 2 dollar payment earlier
to the scenario where the good payment is received in the later period. This property
is studied in DeJarnette, Dillenberger, Gottlieb, and Ortoleva (2019) and Dillenberger,
Gottlieb, and Ortoleva (2018). We find every subject who has an efficiency level of
0.95 for the combined properties of impatience and lottery equivalence (near 80% of all
subjects) also has an efficiency level above 0.95 when requiring stochastic impatience as
well. Thus, stochastic impatience performs well though some caution may be in order
for reasons given in Section 5.4.
1.4 Contribution to revealed preference techniques
Our revealed preference methodology relies on applying Theorem 2 in NOQ. This result
allows one to test if choices from a consumer are consistent with the maximization of a
utility function U satisfying a property P, where P can be represented by some ordering
D.4 The properties we test in this paper can be so represented and thus the NOQ result
applies in principle.
To be specific, suppose Bt is the linear budget set faced by a participant in period
t and suppose ct ∈ Bt is the choice made by the participant in period t. To utilize the
NOQ Theorem one must, for every observation number s and t, ascertain whether there
3The term ‘correlation aversion’ comes from Epstein and Tanny (1980). This property is referred to
as multivariate risk aversion in Richard (1975) and temporal risk aversion in Karady (1982).
4Formally, D is required to be a preorder. D represents some property P if U satisfies P if and only
if the following holds: U(c) ≥ U(c¯) whenever c D c¯.
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exists some c¯ ∈ Bt so that c¯ D cs. As Bt has infinitely many elements, checking this
need not be computationally feasible. In this article we identify conditions on D which
ensure that there is only a finite number c¯ for which the check needs to be carried out.
In this way, we are able to operationalize NOQ’s Theorem 2 and apply it to a large and
relevant class of properties P.
1.5 Remainder of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
related literature; readers anxious to get to the results can skip this in the first reading.
Section 3 presents our experimental design and a preliminary description of our data.
Section 4 explains our revealed preference tests. Section 5 presents the results. Section
6 provides additional tests, including some where a parametric or semiparametric form
are assumed. This is followed by an Appendix containing proofs and other material.
2 Related Literature
The DEU model is the canonical approach to modeling consumer behavior when house-
hold decisions are made in a risky environment over multiple periods. Andersen, Harri-
son, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008) show how features of the DEU model can be leveraged
to recover the discount factor δ using an experiment designed to separately elicit prefer-
ences for risk (allowing for identification of u) and preferences for non-risky intertemporal
payouts (allowing identification of δ).5
The DEU model implies that risky prospects whose payouts are all delivered in the
same period are evaluated using the Expected Utility (EU) model and that non-risky
temporal streams of payouts are evaluated using the Discounted Utility (DU) model.
Thus, the DEU model inherits any undesirable or unrealistic properties of both the
EU and the DU models. For example, the EU model cannot account for the common
consequence or common ratio effects and thus neither can DEU (see Starmer (2000)).6
The DU model cannot account for the common difference effect and thus neither can
DEU (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002)).7
5The case of hyperbolic discounting is also considered. A similar exercise is pursued in Ferecatu and
O¨ncu¨ler (2016) using Bayesian methods.
6Let (a1, a2;π, 1− π) refer to lottery which pays out a1 with probability π and a2 with probability
1−π. A common consequence effect refers to a reversal in preference (a1, a2;π, 1−π) ≻ (ℓ, a2; , π, 1−π)
when a2 is changed. Here ℓ refers to some non-degenerate lottery and a2 is the “common consequence”.
A common ratio violation refers to a reversal in preference (a1, 0;π, 1− π) ≻ (a2, 0;π
′, 1− π′) when π
and π′ are scaled by some common factor α ∈ (0, 1).
7A common difference effect is present when a preference reversal is observed when adding a common
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There are also experiments which show that combining risk and time (for example,
with lotteries which pay out over multiple periods) can produce interesting and unex-
pected behavior. Keren and Roelofsma (1995) show that adding risk to timed payouts
can negate the common difference effect.8 Baucells and Heukamp (2010) show that
adding a delay to lotteries can trigger a version of the common ratio effect. Halevy
(2008), Epper and Fehr-Duda (2018), and Chakraborty, Halevy, and Saito (2020) ex-
plain experimental findings on certain departures from EU, DU, and DEU by applying
the rank dependent utility model in Quiggin (1982).9,10 Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)
present experimental results demonstrating that subjects display a version of the com-
mon ratio effect that contradicts the DEU model.11
The DEU model requires that the function u used to evaluate risk is the same as that
used to evaluate time. This implies that the coefficient of risk aversion is the inverse
of the coefficient of intertemporal substitution. Coble and Lusk (2010), Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a), and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, L’Haridon, and Paraschiv (2013) present
experimental evidence showing that these two functions are not the same.12
The DEU model imposes correlation neutrality. Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974),
Richard (1975), Epstein and Tanny (1980), Bommier (2007), and Van den Heuvel (2008)
present theoretical approaches to modeling attitudes towards intertemporal risk that al-
lows for correlation non-neutrality. The empirical evidence on the validity of correlation
neutrality is less developed. A recent contribution is Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and
Rutstro¨m (2018), who implement an experiment (involving binary choices) on a repre-
sentative sample of the Danish population. They use this data to estimate the utility
functions of representative agents for different segments of the population; these func-
tions are assumed to take a parametric form within the Kihlstrom-Mirman class (see
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974)). They find that this agent is correlation averse and their
approach also allows them to measure the degree of correlation aversion. Our findings on
correlation aversion are broadly consistent with theirs, even though our experiment and
analysis are different. The budgetary data we collect allows us to estimate nonparamet-
delay to the problem of choosing between receiving prize A in period t and prize B in period t′.
8Weber and Chapman (2005) largely confirm these results but with some nuance.
9Other experiments documenting interesting interactions between risk and time preferences can be
found in Anderhub, Gu¨th, Gneezy, and Sonsino (2001), Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007), Epper, Fehr-Duda,
and Bruhin (2011), and Abdellaoui, Kemel, Panin, and Vieider (2019).
10See also Baucells and Heukamp (2012) for a model which can explain some of the departures from
EU and DU.
11This paper has given rise to interesting follow up discussion. See Cheung (2015), Miao and Zhong
(2015), Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015), Andreoni, Feldman, and Sprenger (2017).
12Various theoretical models have been developed that allow for a relaxing of the requirement that
risk and time are evaluated using the same function u. Examples include Selden (1978), Kreps and
Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1990), and Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2019).
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rically (and separately) the utility function of each participant in the experiment and
to ascertain if correlation aversion holds for a given participant.
It is shown in DeJarnette et al. (2019) that DEU implies a property they call risk
seeking over time lotteries (RSTL). RSTL says that a guaranteed payment of receiving
x > 0 dollars with 50 percent chance in period 1 and 50 percent chance in period 3 is
preferred to a guaranteed payment of x dollars in period 2. An experiment presented in
DeJarnette et al. (2019) provides evidence that participants often violate RSTL, thus
demonstrating another problem with the DEU model.
3 Experiment Design and Summary Statistics
We provide subjects with a budget of 100 experimental tokens which they can allocate
over four state and time contingent commodities. A typical consumption bundle is
denoted by
c = (c11, c12, c21, c22)
where cst ≥ 0 refers to consumption in state s at time t. The two states, determined by
a coin toss, are of equal probability; and the two time points are one week later and 9
weeks later. The price vector faced by the subject is denoted by
p = (p11, p12, p21, p22)
where pst > 0 refers to the price of a unit of consumption in state s at time t. In the
experiment, p is generated by having the price for each commodity pst randomly selected
from the set {0.5, 0.8, 1, 1.25, 2}, with at least one price being equal to 1. This gives rise
to 96 distinct price vectors. We randomly select 41 price vectors for each subject with
one of them fixed to be the benchmark vector (1, 1, 1, 1).
At the end of the experiment, each subject is paid according to one randomly selected
decision task by tossing dice according to the Random Incentive Mechanism (RIM).13
Subjects are informed to treat each decision as if it is the sole decision determining their
payments. To control for preferences over the timing of uncertainty resolution, all un-
certainty is resolved at the end of the experiment. Once the decision task is selected and
the state is realized, each subject is paid with an exchange rate of SGD 0.2 (about USD
0.15) per experimental token. To increase the credibility of payment, subjects are paid
with post-dated checks that will not be honored by the local bank when presented prior
to the date indicated. To further control for the potential difference in transaction cost
13For the validity of RIM, readers can refer to Wakker (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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at different time points (Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b)), subjects receive a minimum
participation fee of SGD 12 (with SGD 6 for each payday). Experimental earnings are
added to these minimum payments.
While our experiment uses monetary rewards, utility is derived from actual con-
sumption in most theoretical models.14 Halevy (2014) provides a detailed defense of
the use of monetary rewards in the study of time preference. Among other things, he
highlights the considerable evidence in favor a high correlation between modest income
gains (such as those won in an experiment) and contemporaneous consumption; this
suggests that concerns about the use of monetary rewards, which are typically based on
some version of the permanent income hypothesis, may be overstated. It is also worth
observing that our experiment involves both time and risk, and those experiments which
involve only risk or uncertainty are often based on monetary rewards. Thus our use of
monetary rewards makes it easier for us to compare our conclusions on subjects’ risk
attitudes with those conclusions drawn from experiments that involve only risk.
A total of 103 undergraduate students were recruited as participants through an
advertisement posted in the Integrated Virtual Learning Environment at the National
University of Singapore. The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Center
for Behavioral Economics at the National University of Singapore. Conducted by two
of the authors and a research assistant, the experiment consists of four sessions with 20
to 30 subjects in each session. After the subjects arrived at the experiment venue, they
were given the consent form approved by the Institutional Review Board of the National
University of Singapore. Following that, general instructions were read aloud to the
subjects, and several examples were demonstrated to them before they started making
their decisions. The experimental instructions follow closely those in Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a) (See the Online Appendix for the Experimental Instructions). Most
of our subjects completed the tasks within 30 minutes. At the end of the experiment,
they approach the experimenters one by one, toss the dice and receive payments in
post-dated checks based on their choice. On average, the subjects are paid SGD 22.
14Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2015) examine time preference over effort and show that the
incentive for smoothing is higher for effort than for monetary rewards. Nonetheless, Reuben, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2010) elicit discount factors for both monetary rewards and primary rewards of chocolate
and find a positive and statistically significant relation between the two. The observed correlation
is further corroborated by neuroimaging studies which show that the same limbic areas of the brain
are activated irrespective of monetary or primary rewards (McClure, Laibson, Lowenstein, and Cohen
(2004); McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2007)).
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Figure 1: Average tokens allocated to each asset
3.1 Aggregate Behavior
Figure 1 plots the average allocation of tokens for each of the four commodities under
each price.15 Two patterns arise. First, the average allocation is lower when the price
is higher, suggesting that the law of demand is satisfied in aggregate. Second, at any
given price, the allocation to the early time point is larger than that to the late time
point, which is indicative evidence that subjects are on average impatient.
We further conduct regression analyses with the tokens allocated to each commodity
as dependent variables and the prices for all the commodities as independent variables.
We apply a Tobit regression model with censoring at both 0 and 100, given the concern
of corner choices. From the results reported in Table 1 below, we observe that the
tokens allocated to each commodity is negatively affected by its own price, and positive
affected by the price of the other three commodities. Moreover, the cross-price effect
is stronger if the two commodities are within same state, compared to when they are
within the same time period. For example the price effect of state 1 time 2 price changes
on the state 1 time 1 consumption is 24.757. This is much larger than the price effect
of state 2 time 1 price changes on the state 1 time 1 consumption which is 3.660. This
suggests that the motive for diversification across states is stronger than the motive for
15This is computed as the average allocation to an asset at a given price for that asset, across all
observations and all subjects, without regard to the prices of other assets.
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smoothing across time points.
Table 1: Regression Analysis on Price Effect.
c1,1 c2,1 c2,1 c2,2
p1,1 -38.831*** 3.902*** 31.237*** 2.367**
(3.872) (1.425) (2.584) (1.157)
p2,1 3.660*** -38.384*** 4.640*** 31.198***
(1.205) (3.497) (1.458) (2.715)
p1,2 24.757*** 3.517*** -40.866*** 1.928
(2.138) (1.300) (4.447) (1.302)
p2,2 1.924** 23.524*** 3.750*** -39.549***
(0.862) (1.821) (1.305) (4.317)
constant 30.120*** 28.292*** 9.147** 12.055***
(2.846) (3.237) (3.737) (3.401)
Observations 4,223 4,223 4,223 4,223
Pseudo R-squared 0.0659 0.0689 0.0701 0.0745
We find a substantial number of corner choices made. By a corner choice we mean
a round of the experiment where the subject allocates 0 tokens to one of the assets. We
find that 49 percent of participants make corner choices in all rounds of the experiment
and 91 percent make at least one corner choice. These numbers seem consistent with
convex time budget experiment of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) where 37 percent of
subjects make only corner solutions.16
4 Utility Functions and Revealed Preference Tests
The goal of this section is to explain the revealed preference techniques used in our
analysis. We shall only be interested in utility functions which are continuous and
increasing and so we embed this into the definition of utility.
Definition 1. A utility function is a strictly increasing and continuous function U :
R
4
+ → R.
4.1 Quantifying Imperfect Utility Maximization
An e-utility maximizer is an agent who possesses some utility function U and some
number e ∈ [0, 1] so that when choosing from budget set B(p, w) = {c ∈ R4+ : p · c ≤ w},
selects a bundle c¯ ∈ B(p, w) that satisfy
U(c¯) ≥ U(c), for all c ∈ B(p, ew) (2)
16It seems reasonable that simply having more commodities would make corner solutions more likely.
The experiment of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) has only two goods (there is no risk) and so the
presence of fewer all-corner solutions may be due to the fact that they have fewer goods.
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Such an e is said to be the agent’s efficiency level. Of course, an agent who maximizes
U with e = 1 is a utility-maximizing agent in the familiar sense.
Given a data set of demand observations, we could ask if it is consistent with utility-
maximization at a given efficiency level. This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 2. Suppose c1, . . . , cN are the bundles chosen by a subject in rounds 1
through N of the experiment and let p1, . . . , pN be the corresponding price vectors.
We refer to the collection O = {(c1, p1), . . . , (cN , pN)} as a dataset. The dataset O is
rationalized by utility function U at efficiency level e if the choices made could have
been made by an e-utility maximizer with utility function U . That is, for all n
U(cn) ≥ U(c), for all c ∈ B(pn, epn · cn) (3)
A dataset O that admits such a utility function U is said to be e-rationalizable.
Obviously, if a dataset O is e-rationalizable then it is also e′-rationalizable for any
e′ < e. The critical cost efficiency index (see Afriat (1972)) is defined as
e¯ = sup
{
e ∈ [0, 1] : O is e-rationalizable
}
. (4)
4.2 Utility functions satisfying further properties
Let P denote a property which a utility function may or may not possess17 and let
e ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the choices of one subject from our experiment. We would like to
develop a way to answer the following question: does there exist a utility function U
satisfying P that rationalizes the choices of the subject at efficiency level e? We focus
on properties P which can be represented by a preorder.18
Definition 3. Let D be a preorder and let U be a utility function. Utility function U
agrees with D if
c D c′ =⇒ U(c) ≥ U(c′), for all c, c′ ∈ R4+ (5)
While it can be difficult to determine if a subject’s choices can be rationalized by a
utility function that agrees with some arbitrary preorder D, we shall see that when the
preorder satisfies the following property the task is greatly simplified.
17Formally, one may take P to be a set of utility functions. Then, when we say U possesses property
P we just mean U ∈ P.
18A preorder is a transitive and reflexive binary relation.
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Definition 4. A preorder D is a composable preorder if for all c, c′ ∈ R4+
there exists c¯ so that c D c¯ ≥ c′ ⇐⇒ there exists c˜ so that c ≥ c˜ D c′
where ≥ is the product order on R4+.
Note that, by definition a utility function is an increasing function and thus it must
agree with the product order ≥; what composability guarantees is that the added prop-
erty D interacts nicely with ≥. We impose two other, relatively innocuous conditions
(in addition to the composable condition), on all preorders considered in this paper and
refer to a preorder which satisfies all three conditions as well-behaved. A full definition
of a well-behaved preorder can be found in the Appendix (Section A.1).
We now present two key preference properties studied in this paper; each property
is captured by agreement with a particular well-behaved preorder. It is convenient to
denote the consumption bundle of an agent by c = (c1, c2), where c1 = (c11, c12) denotes
state 1 consumption (at dates 1 and 2) and c2 = (c21, c22) denotes state 2 consumption.
Lottery Equivalence This property says that swapping the consumption streams in
states 1 and 2 makes no difference to utility. It makes sense if the realized state has
no intrinsic significance for the agent’s preference. Thus the bundles (a, b) and (b, a)
would both simply correspond to a lottery that pays out streams a and b with equal
probability and thus must give the same utility.
Definition 5. A utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies lottery equivalence if
U(a, b) = U(b, a), for all a, b ∈ R2+.
The lottery equivalence property can be re-stated as an agreement with a preorder
D. The lottery equivalence preorder DLE is defined as follows:
(a, b) DLE (a, b) and (a, b) DLE (b, a)
for all a, b ∈ R2+. It is straightforward to check that DLE is a preorder and that it is
composable (and in fact it is also well-behaved). The asymmetric part of DLE is empty:
there are no elements c and c′ such that c ⊲LE c
′. The lottery equivalence property for a
utility function U can be equivalently stated as follows: U(c) ≥ U(c′) whenever c DLE c
′.
Impatience. In models of time preference, it is common to postulate that agents
are impatient, which means that an agent has a preference for receiving sooner pay-
13
ments over later payments. When confined to a consumption stream with no risk (in
our context, this would be a bundle of the form ((a, b), (a, b))), the property says that
U((a, b), (a, b)) ≥ U((b, a), (b, a)) if a ≥ b. A stronger version of this property is to
require impatience to hold state-by-state, which is captured by the following definition.
Definition 6. The utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies impatience if
U((a, b), (a′, b′)) ≥ U((a˜, b˜), (a˜′, b˜′))
whenever any of the following hold:
(i) a ≥ b, a˜ = b, b˜ = a, and (a′, b′) = (a˜′, b˜′);
(ii) a′ ≥ b′, a˜′ = b′, b˜′ = a′, and (a, b) = (a˜, b˜); and
(iii) a ≥ b, a′ ≥ b′, a˜ = b, b˜ = a, and a˜′ = b′, b˜′ = a′.19
We define DI as follows: ((a, b), (a
′, b′)) DI ((a˜, b˜), (a˜
′, b˜′)) if either ((a, b), (a′, b′)) =
((a˜, b˜), (a˜′, b˜′)) or (i), (ii) or (iii) in Definition 6 holds. It is straightforward to check that
DI is composable (indeed, well-behaved) preorder with a nonempty asymmetric part,
20
and a utility function U satisfies impatience if and only if U(c) ≥ U(c′) whenever c DI c
′.
Lottery Equivalence and Impatience. Both lottery equivalence and impatience
are natural properties in our choice environment and it would be useful to check if a
dataset can be rationalized by a utility function with both properties. This corresponds
to requiring that U agrees with the preorder DLEI , which is the transitive closure of
DLE and DI .
21 Our testing procedure is applicable so long as DLEI is a well-behaved
preorder. It turns out that that is indeed the case.
There are other properties studied in this paper which can be defined as agreement
with a well-behaved preorder. Furthermore, these preorders can also be combined, via
transitive closure, while remaining well-behaved (see Appendix (Sections A.2 and A.3)
for the details). This means that we have the ability to test for e-rationalization by a
utility function with any combination of such properties.
In our experiment the two states are equally likely. In this case, the utility function
19(i) corresponds to the case where utility is increased if the state 1 consumption stream is altered from
(b, a) to (a, b), which brings forward the larger consumption and postpones the smaller consumption,
while keeping state 2 consumption fixed. Case (ii) corresponds to the case where the change takes place
in state 2, while (iii) corresponds to the case where consumption in both states are altered.
20For example, ((2, 1), c2) ⊲ ((1, 2), c2) for any c2.
21We write c D+ c
′ if either c DLE c
′ or c DI c
′. By definition, c DLEI c
′ if there exists some finite
sequence c1, . . . , cK so that c D+ c
1 D+ c
2 D+ . . . D+ c
K D+ c
′.
14
U : R4+ → R has the discounted expected utility (DEU) form if
U(c11, c12, c21, c22) =
1
2
(u(c11) + δu(c12)) +
1
2
(u(c21) + δu(c22)) (6)
for some strictly increasing function u : R+ → R and δ ∈ (0, 1]. It is clear that with
this form, both lottery equivalence and impatience holds. However, this is by no means
the only case where these properties are satisfied; we postpone the discussion of other
functional forms with these properties to Section 4.4.
4.3 Revealed Preference and GARP
We refer to a dataset O = {(c1, p1), . . . , (cN , pN)} as e-rationalizable-D if it can be
rationalized by a utility function that agrees with D at efficiency level e. Clearly, if O is
e-rationalizable-D for some e then O is e′-rationalizable-D for any e′ < e. Our objective
is to devise a way to calculate the (generalized) critical cost efficiency index
e¯(D) = sup
{
e ∈ [0, 1] : O is e-rationalizable- D
}
. (7)
Note that e¯ as defined by (4) must satisfy e¯ ≥ e¯(D).
Let ID(c) be the set of bundles ranked weakly better than c under the D preorder.
That is
ID(c) = {c¯ ∈ R4+ : c¯ D c} (8)
Given O, let C = {c1, . . . , cN}. We define two binary relations on C.
Definition 7. Let D be a preorder, e ∈ [0, 1], and O = {(c1, p1, ), . . . , (cN , pN)} be a
dataset. For cn, cm ∈ C write cn D∗e c
m if there exists c¯ ∈ ID(cm) so that
epn · cn ≥ pn · c¯ or cn ≥ c¯ (9)
If ≥ can be replaced by its strict version in (9) then we write cn ⊲∗e c
m.22 We refer to D∗e
and ⊲∗e as, respectively, the revealed preferred and strictly revealed preferred relations.
If a subject is truly an e-utility maximizer with a utility function that agrees with
preorder D, then cn D∗e c
m implies U(cn) ≥ U(cm) and cn ⊲∗e c
m implies U(cn) > U(cm).
Thus, the following property must hold for such a subject.
22Some authors use ⊲∗e to represent the asymmetric part of the preorder D
∗
e. That is c ⊲
∗
e c
′ if c D∗e c
′
and not c′ D∗e c. Note that our notation differs from this usage.
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Definition 8. A dataset O = {(c1, p1, ), . . . , (cN , pN)} satisfies the e-Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference according to D (e-GARP-D)23 if the revealed preference relations
contain no strict cycles in the following sense: for any sequence n1, n2, . . . , nK where
cn1 D∗e c
n2 D∗e . . . D
∗
e c
nK
it is not the case that cnK ⊲∗e c
n1 .
The following proposition is the theoretical result underpinning the testing proce-
dures in this paper. It relates the notion of e-GARP-D to that of rationalizing O with
a utility function that agrees with D.
Proposition 1. Let D be a well-behaved preorder and let O = {(c1, p1), . . . , (cN , pN)}
be a dataset. Then e¯(D) (as defined by (7)) satisfies
e¯(D) = sup
{
e ∈ [0, 1] : O satisfies e-GARP- D
}
This proposition states that the critical cost efficiency index e¯(D) equals the supre-
mum of those efficiency levels e at which e-GARP-D holds. Determining the latter is
straightforward once the revealed preference relations have been computed, since there
are well known algorithms for checking the absence of strict cycles. Working out the
revealed preference relations in turn require determining the set ID(c) (defined in (8)).
Crucially, for the preorders considered in this paper, this set is finite (see Appendix,
Sections A.2 and A.3). For example, it is clear that
IDLE(a, b) = {(a, b), (b, a)}.
Writing out IDI (a, b) or IDLEI (a, b) is a bit more longwinded but it is not difficult and,
plainly, the set is finite. In the Appendix (Section A.4) we provide a systematic way of
working out ID(c) for a general class of preorders D that contain all those considered in
this paper. The bottomline is that, with Proposition 1, we now have a workable way of
computing the critical cost efficiency index.
4.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 is found in full in the Appendix (Section A.1). It uses
Theorem 2 in NOQ and here we outline the connection between the two results.
23The term ‘generalized axiom of revealed preference’ as well as its acronym GARP is from the
treatment of Afriat’s Theorem in Varian (1982). Our concept generalizes the original definition; this is
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3.2.
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Given a preorder D, let D•≥ be the transitive closure of D and ≥.24 NOQ’s result
uses the binary relation D⋆e , where c
n D⋆e c
m if there exists c¯ ∈ ID•≥(cm) so that (9)
holds. One may state NOQ’s Theorem 2 in our context as saying the following: the
choices of a subject can be rationalized (at efficiency level e) by a utility function U
that agrees with D if and only if D⋆e is strict cycle free in the sense of Definition 8.
25
Notice that straightforwardly applying NOQ’s result would require checking if cn D⋆e
cm, which may be problematic because the set ID•≥(c) has infinitely many members.
The contribution of Proposition 1 is to establish that D⋆e and D
∗
e are identical when D is
composable, and D∗e is easier to check because I
D(c) is a finite set in many applications.
In other words, when the preorder is composable, NOQ’s Theorem 2 becomes fully
operational as a revealed preference test.26
4.3.2 Afriat’s Theorem
Proposition 1 delivers a version of Afriat’s Theorem as a special case. If one chooses D
as the trivial equality preorder (by definition, c D c¯ if c = c¯) then the revealed preference
relation in Definition 7 reduces to cn D∗e c
m if either epn · cn ≥ pn · cm or cn ≥ cm, and
the acyclicality condition in Definition 8 reduces to GARP (at efficiency level e) as it is
usually defined. Thus Proposition 1 with the equality preorder recovers the known result
that the critical cost efficiency index e¯ (as defined by (4)) is equal to the supremum of
those efficiency levels at which GARP holds.27
4.4 Functional Form Restrictions on Utility
We have already observed that when U : R4+ → R has the DEU form, both the lottery
equivalence and impatience properties are satisfied. More generally, lottery equivalence
holds if U is weakly separable across states, i.e., there is a strictly increasing function
f : R2+ → R and a strictly increasing and symmetric function G : R(f) → R (where
R(f) denotes the range of f) such that
U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = G(f(a, b), f(a′, b′)) (10)
24Let a D¯ b if either a D b or a ≥ b. The transitive closure of D and ≥ is the binary relation D+,
where c D+ c′ if there is a sequence c1, . . . , cK so that c D¯ c1 D¯ c2 D¯ . . . D¯ cK D¯ c′.
25A nuance is that the strict relations ⊲∗e and ⊲
⋆
e are defined slightly differently. This is explained
in the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
26Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2017) use Theorem 2 in NOQ to test for symmetry and other properties
of the utility function. The algorithm they employ can be thought of as an application of Proposition
1, in the sense that the preorders they impose are all composable.
27For a direct proof of this claim see Halevy et al. (2018).
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This is known as a weakly separable form because for an agent with such a utility, the
agent’s preference between ((a, b), c2) and ((a¯, b¯), c2)) hinges only on whether f(a, b) is
smaller or greater than f(a¯, b¯) and is independent of the consumption stream (c2) in
state 2. Hence, for an agent with such a preference, it makes sense to speak of the
agent’s preference over the consumption stream realized in state s, without reference to
consumption in other states. We shall refer to a utility function taking the form in (10)
as state-separable.
Note that state-separable is not implied by lottery equivalence. For example,
U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = f(a, b) + h(a, b)h(a′, b′) + f(a′, b′) (11)
obeys lottery equivalence but cannot be expressible in the form (10).28 Lottery equiva-
lence also holds if U is separable across time, i.e., there are strictly increasing functions
H and g, with g symmetric, such that
U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = H(g(a, a′), g(b, b′)) (12)
For the functional form (10), impatience holds if f has the property that f(a, b) ≥
f(b, a) whenever a ≥ b. For example, impatience holds if f(a, b) = u(a) + δu(b) where
u is strictly increasing and continuous, and δ ∈ (0, 1]. In the case of (11), impatience is
satisfied if h (and f) has the property that h(a, b) ≥ h(b, a) whenever a ≥ b.
An important special case of (10) is the Kihlstrom-Mirman form (after the represen-
tation in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974)), where there are strictly increasing functions
φ and u and a number δ > 0 such that
U(c) = φ
(
u(c1,1) + δu(c1,2)
)
+ φ
(
u(c2,1) + δu(c2,2)
)
(13)
This form obeys lottery equivalence and, if δ ∈ (0, 1], impatience as well.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we use the NOQ method (as captured by Proposition 1) to test different
restrictions on the utility function against the experimental data. We consider several
different models, but all of them are weaker than discounted expected utility. By looking
at the variation in their performances, we aim to establish precisely which features of
the DEU model are less supported by observed choices.
28Notice that the ranking between two state 1 consumption streams, say (a, b) and (a¯, b¯), clearly
depends on the state 2 consumption stream (a′, b′).
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We begin by addressing the first and most elementary issue: are the subjects maxi-
mizing any utility function?
5.1 Testing For Utility Maximization
Table 2: Pass Rates for Utility Maximization
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Experimental subjects 71.8 90.3 97.1
Uniform random datasets 0.0 0.0 0.0
Resampled datasets 24.3 38.6 65.7
We first test how the participants in the experiments are behaving as imperfect
utility-maximizers by calculating their efficiency indices. The basic utility-maximization
model appears to perform very well, with virtually everyone having critical cost efficiency
indices that exceed 0.9, and more than 70 percent behaving in a way almost indistin-
guishable from exact utility-maximizers. (See the first row of Table 2.)
To remove the possibility that this is due to an overly lax experimental environ-
ment, we use two methods to check the power of our experiment. In both methods, we
created 10,000 simulated datasets (each of which has 41 observations) and calculated
their efficiency indices. In the first method we generate observations using uniformly
random allocations in which the expended tokens sum up to 100. In the second method,
we first pool the decisions made by all subjects in the experiment and then generate
datasets (with 41 observations each) by sampling from this set. The results for the
first and second method are reported in the second and third rows of Table 2. A van-
ishingly small number of datasets generated by the first method are consistent with
utility-maximization at any reasonable efficiency threshold; for random datasets gener-
ated via the second method, the efficiency indices are higher but still not at all close to
the results from the (actual) experimental datasets.
Together these results give strong support to the hypothesis that subjects are max-
imizing some utility function. Let us now move on to test what properties these utility
functions are likely to satisfy.
5.2 Three properties of the DEU Model
In this subsection, we focus on three properties of the discounted expected utility model.
It is clear that a discounted expected utility function satisfies impatience and lottery
equivalence. But this utility form has a property stronger than lottery equivalence: it
also satisfies correlation neutrality.
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Definition 9. A utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies correlation neutrality if
U
(
(a, b), (a′, b′)
)
= U
(
(a′, b), (a, b′)
)
and (14)
U
(
(a, b), (a′, b′)
)
= U
(
(a, b′), (a, b)
)
(15)
for all (a, b) and (a′, b′) in R2+.
Notice that equations (14) and (15) together imply lottery equivalence so correlation
neutrality is a stronger property than lottery equivalence. Correlation neutrality requires
a subject to be indifferent between a lottery that (say) pays out consumption streams
of (0, 10) and (5, 0) with equal probability and another that pays out (5, 10) and (0, 0)
with equal probability: the fact that the second lottery involves correlation, in the sense
that both the favorable payouts occur in the same state, does not bother the subject.
Plainly, correlation neutrality holds in the DEU model and, more generally, it holds
when the utility function is separable across time (see (12)).
Correlation neutrality can also be tested using Proposition 1 via an appropriately
chosen preorder (see Appendix). Table 3 reports the performance of four properties
(lottery equivalence, impatience, their combination, and lastly correlation neutrality)
as measured by their respective efficiency indices. Notice that, for all of these mod-
els, the pass rates at a given efficiency threshold is lower than that for (basic) utility-
maximization, which is as it should be, since the models tested in Table 2 are all more
stringent.
Table 3: Pass Rates for DEU properties
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Lottery Equivalence (LE) 62.1 84.5 93.2
Impatience 65.1 84.5 92.2
LE and Impatience 55.3 79.6 91.3
Correlation Neutrality 14.6 22.3 56.3
5.2.1 Lottery Equivalence
We see from Table 3 that a large proportion of subjects display behavior roughly con-
sistent with the maximization of a lottery equivalent utility function. Imposing lottery
equivalence must mean lower pass rates compared to the basic utility-maximization
model, but the drop in pass rates are quite modest. For example, while 84.5 percent of
our experiment participants have an efficiency index above 0.95 for lottery equivalent
utility maximization, the corresponding percentage for utility-maximization (see Table
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2) is 90.3 percent. (The efficiency index of an additional six participants fall below 0.95
when lottery equivalence is imposed.)
Lottery equivalence may seem like a very reasonable property, but the imposition of
this condition has strong implications over and above that from utility-maximization.
In particular, a violation of this property can occur with just a single observation,
something that is not possible with utility-maximization (where violations can only be
observed with multiple observations). As an example we consider subject 10. Subject
10 has a basic efficiency index of 0.976 but it drops to 0.917 when lottery equivalence
is imposed. Why has this occurred? Examining even the subject’s very first decision is
instructive. In observation 1 the subject faces p1 = ((1.25, 2), (1, 0.8)) and purchases c1 =
((48, 0), (40, 0)). This violates lottery equivalence since the subject could instead have
purchased the bundle ((40, 0), (50, 0)), which any lottery equivalent utility-maximizer
would strictly prefer to c1.
The behavior exhibited by participant 10 is not rare: we find that almost 40 percent
of subjects would (at some observation) purchase a bundle which would have been
cheaper to buy by merely swapping the states in which consumption was taking place
(thus freeing up tokens for more consumption). Of course, these violations, while fairly
numerous, usually involve only small cost inefficiencies, which is why the efficiency
indices across the experiment population remain high.
We view the fact that 84.5 percent of participants have an efficiency index in excess
of 0.95 for lottery equivalence as convincing evidence in favor of the notion that most
participants have preferences satisfying this property. A potential objection to this claim
would be to assert that our test lacks power to properly reject the notion of lottery
equivalent utility maximization. To provide evidence against this claim we introduce
a new restriction on utility functions which is equally restrictive as lottery equivalence
and compare their performance. A utility function U is said to satisfy time neutrality if
U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = U((b, a), (b′, a′))
for any (a, b) and (a′, b′). This property is not an implication of DEU model, unless δ = 1.
Since the prices on all four goods are chosen with the same distribution, the correlation
neutrality and time neutraility properties must, in formal terms, be equally restrictive.
But their performances differ sharply (see Table 4). For example, only 68.9 percent
of participants have efficiency indices in excess of 0.95 for the time neutral property,
considerably below the 84.5 percent reported for lottery equivalence. To check this
rigorously, we apply the one-sided version of the McNemar test (see Fagerland, Lydersen,
and Laake (2014)), under the null hypothesis that the probability of a participant having
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an efficiency index above a certain level for lottery equivalence is the same as that for
time neutrality. We report p-values for efficiency thresholds of 0.99, 0.95, and 0.9. We
see strong evidence that the pass rates at a given efficiency threshold is different for the
two tests.
Table 4: Pass Rates: Lottery Equivalence vs Time Neutrality
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Lottery Equivalence 62.1 84.5 93.2
Time Neutrality 56.3 68.9 79.6
McNemar Test p-values 0.066 0.000 0.000
5.2.2 Correlation Neutrality
It is fair to say that correlation neutrality performs abysmally, with only 22.3 percent of
participants having a efficiency index score in excess of 0.95 (see Table 3). Many previous
papers have commented on theoretical grounds on the undesirability of this implication
of the DEU model. Fishburn (1970), Richard (1975), and Duffie and Epstein (1992) are
examples. Our results give a sense of the degree to which this matters: if we wanted to
make the modest claim that half of our participants satisfy correlation neutrality then
we would have to allow for them to waste as much as 10 percent of their budget in their
purchasing decisions; in contrast, the choice behavior of half of the subject population
can be exactly rationalized by lottery equivalent utility functions.
We explore properties that relax correlation neutrality in Section 5.3.
5.2.3 Impatience
We find that 84.5 percent of subjects have an efficiency index in excess of 0.95 (see Table
3). Notice that this the same proportion that satisfy lottery equivalence at the 0.95
efficiency threshold (although the subjects in the two groups do not coincide exactly).
As in the case of lottery equivalence, there are violations of impatience that could be
established with just one observation. For example, subject 36 has a perfect efficiency
level for basic utility maximization but the efficiency level drops to 0.9 for impatient
utility maximization. As an example of a violation, consider observation 15, where
p15 = ((0.5, 1.25), (0.8, 1)) and the subject purchased c15 = ((100, 0), (0, 50)). Obviously,
the subject could have purchased ((100, 0), (50, 0)) for only 90 tokens which is a bundle
that any impatient utility maximizer must consider at least as good as c15. We find
violations of this type to be infrequent; indeed, 81.6 percent of subjects do not have
any single-observation violations (such as the one exhibited by subject 36). Overall, the
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introduction of impatience causes the efficiency index to fall below 0.95 for an additional
six subjects.
To provide evidence that our result is not driven by the laxity of the impatience
property, we introduce the complementary property of patience. A utility function
U satisfies patience if U(c1, c2) ≥ U(c
′
1, c
′
2) whenever impatience requires U(c1, c2) ≤
U(c′1, c
′
2) (according to the criteria set out in Definition 6). It is clear that in the context
of this experiment, patience and impatience are equally restrictive properties. We find
that only 66.0 percent of participants have an efficiency index in excess of 0.95 for the
patience property, which is considerably below the 84.4 percent found for the impatience
property. The pass rates are reported in Table 5, with the McNemar Test confirming
our informal observation on the significance of the difference in pass rates.
Table 5: Pass Rates: Impatience vs Patience
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Impatience 65.1 84.5 92.2
Patience 50.5 66.0 73.8
McNemar Test 0.001 0.000 0.000
5.2.4 Joint Test of Lottery Equivalence and Impatience
We now turn to the hypothesis that each agent has a utility function that satisfies
both lottery equivalence and impatience.29 Note that it is quite possible for a subject’s
behavior (say) to be exactly rationalized by a utility function that obeys impatience and
also exactly rationalized by a utility function that obeys lottery equivalence, but for it
not to be exactly rationalized by a utility function with both properties. More generally,
for a given subject, the efficiency index for the combined property can be strictly lower
than the subject’s efficiency index for lottery equivalence and for impatience separately.
It follows from this observation that, while the pass rates for lottery equivalence and
the pass rates for impatience impose upper bounds on the pass rate for the combined
property, it is theoretically possible for the performance of the combined property to be
much worse than that for the two properties separately. It turns out that that is not
the case. The pass rate for the combined property remains high; in particular, almost
80 percent of subjects have efficiency indices exceeding 0.95 for the combined property
(see Table 3).
29If two properties can be defined as agreement with two distinct preorders, then a utility function will
satisfy both properties if and only if it agrees with the transitive closure of the two preorders. So long
as this transitive closure is also a well-behaved preorder, testing can be carried out using Proposition
1. See Section 4.2 and the Appendix (Sections A.2 and A.3) for further explanation.
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For the remaining tests in this section, we shall maintain lottery equivalence and
impatience as background assumptions. Not only are these properties ubiquitously
assumed in the theory and also intuitive, our experimental evidence has confirmed their
viability as maintained assumptions.
5.2.5 Testing DEU
So far we have discussed our findings on lottery equivalence, correlation neutrality,
and impatience. While these properties are implied by the DEU model, they are not
sufficient to guarantee the DEU form. For the DEU model to hold, the independence
axiom would have to be added to these properties.30 However, the independence axiom
cannot be tested in isolation using Proposition 1, because there is no preorder D that
represents the independence axiom. Nonetheless, it is possible to test the independence
axiom jointly with the other properties, since there is a nonparametric test for the DEU
model (specifically, to test if U has the form given by (6)) using the method in Polisson
et al. (2017). We did not perform that test because it is clear that the model would
perform poorly: its pass rates at any efficiency threshold would have to be even lower
than that for correlation neutrality.
5.3 Correlation Attitudes
We know that correlation neutrality is broadly rejected by the data. We now investigate
whether there is anything more that we can say about correlation attitudes and, in
particular, whether there is support for the correlation aversion property.
Definition 10. Let U : R4+ → R be a utility function satisfying lottery equivalence. U
satisfies correlation aversion if for all payouts a ≥ a′ and b ≥ b′
U
(
(a′, b), (a, b′)
)
≥ U
(
(a, b), (a′, b′)
)
(16)
30To be specific, we would need the following version (due to Debreu (1959)) of the independence
axiom which is appropriate in our context:
(c′1, c2)  (c1, c
′
2) and (c
′′
1 , c
′
2)  (c
′
1, c
′′
2) =⇒ (c
′′
1 , c2)  (c1, c
′′
2), ∀c1, c
′
1, c
′′
1 , c2, c
′
2, c
′′
2 ∈ R
2
+
If  satisfies this property and correlation neutrality, then Theorem 11.1 in Fishburn (1970) shows that
 can be represented by U(c1,1, c1,2, c2,1, c2,2) = u1(c1,1) + u2(c1,2) + u1(c2,1) + u2(c2,2) for increasing
and continuous functions u1 and u2. From this, it is not difficult to show that u2 = δu1 for δ ∈ (0, 1] if
impatience and the following property holds:
((a, d), (a′, d))  ((b, d), (b′, d)) ⇐⇒ ((d, a), (d, a′))  ((d, b), (d, b′)) ∀a, a′, b, b′, d ∈ R+.
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If the above inequality is reversed then U is correlation seeking.
Since we assume that U satisfies lottery equivalence, if (16) holds then so does
U((a, b′), (a′, b)) ≥ U((a, b), (a′, b′)). Whether it is this inequality or (16), a subject who
satisfies correlation aversion prefers a lottery where high and low payouts occur at each
state, over a lottery where all the high payouts are concentrated in one state.
Obviously the DEU model is consistent with correlation aversion since it implies the
even stronger property of correlation neutrality. In the case of the Kihlstrom-Mirman
model (see (13)), we know from the analysis of Richard (1975) that if φ is concave then
U displays correlation aversion.
Table 6 reports the results of our tests of correlation aversion and correlation seeking.
Both of these properties are combined with lottery equivalence and impatience in our
tests, so the pass rates obtained must be lower than those reported in the third row
of Table 3. Note that we are not testing correlation seeking because we think it is a
plausible global property for a subject’s preference; instead, we are testing this property
in order to confirm the power of our test to reject the correlation aversion property.31
Notice that 75.7 percent of subjects have efficiency indices of 0.95 or higher; in
other words, 75.7 percent of subjects are e-rationalized (for any e ∈ [0, 0.95)) by utility
functions that obey (jointly) lottery equivalence, impatience and correlation aversion.
This is only marginally lower than the proportion (79.6 percent) of those who, at the
same efficiency threshold, satisfy lottery equivalence and impatience jointly (see Table
3). Furthermore, in our experimental environment, the correlation seeking hypothesis
is formally no more or less restrictive than correlation aversion, and yet it is clear from
Table 6 that the pass rate for this feature is significantly lower. Together, these results
give strong support to the correlation aversion property.
Table 6: Pass Rates: Correlation Aversion vs Correlation Seeking
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Correlation Aversion 51.5 75.7 89.3
Coreelation Seeking 16.5 26.2 52.4
McNemar Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Another way of comparing the performance of correlation aversion and correlation
seeking is to consider the proportion of subjects who have a correlation aversion effi-
ciency level which is higher than their correlation seeking efficiency level. Table 7 shows
that 67.96 percent of participants have a higher efficiency level for correlation aversion
31We used the same idea in Section 5.2.1 when testing lottery equivalence and time neutrality.
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compared to correlation seeking while only 5.83 percent of participants have a higher
efficiency level for correlation seeking compared to correlation aversion.
Table 7: Efficiency Levels: Correlation Aversion vs Correlation Seeking
aversion > seeking seeking > aversion tie
67.96 % 5.83 % 26.21 %
The support we find in our data for correlation aversion as opposed to correlation
neutrality suggests that the behavior of our experimental subjects is not well represented
by the DEU model, and more generally, by any model that is separable across time (see
(12)). On the other hand, there is some experimental evidence indicating that a subject’s
preference for lotteries that pay out at time t are unaffected by the presence of lotteries,
with independent realizations, in a future period t′, which supports a time-separable
utility formulation (see Andreoni et al. (2017)). In fact, it is possible to reconcile these
results because there are utility functions that satisfy correlation aversion and are also
time-separable when lotteries are independent. We discuss this in greater detail in the
Appendix (Section A.5).
5.4 Stochastic Impatience
The concept of stochastic impatience has been introduced recently in DeJarnette et al.
(2019). Consider the following two lotteries. Lottery C pays out, with equal probability,
either 100 dollars in a day’s time or 20 dollars in a month. Lottery D pays out, again
with equal probability, 20 dollars in a day’s time or 100 dollars in one month. It
seems reasonable that an ‘impatient’ person might prefer lottery C to lottery D: in both
lotteries, the realized payouts are the same, but lottery C delivers the higher payout
sooner. More generally, this preference is captured by the following definition.
Definition 11. A utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies stochastic impatience
32 if it
satisfies lottery equivalence and for all d ≤ b ≤ a,
U
(
(a, d), (d, b)
)
≥ U
(
(b, d), (d, a)
)
. (17)
If the above inequality is reversed we say that U satisfies stochastic patience.
Note that stochastic impatience is not implied by impatience as we have defined
it, even though it is implied by correlation neutrality and impatience jointly and thus,
32This definition, applicable to consumption streams, is in the Appendix of DeJarnette et al. (2019).
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importantly, it is a feature of the DEU model. Indeed,
U((b, d), (d, a)) = U((d, d), (b, a)) ≤ U((d, d), (a, b)) = U((a, d), (d, b))
where the first and last equalities follow from the lottery equivalence and the inequality
from impatience. In the case of the Kihlstrom-Mirman model, we show that stochastic
impatience holds if (and essentially only if) u(r) ≥ 0 for all r ≥ 0 and φ has the property
that the function Φ given by
Φ(z) = φ(exp(z)) (18)
is a convex function (see Proposition 3 in the Appendix).33,34
Table 8 presents the results of our test of stochastic impatience (both with and
without correlation aversion imposed). We see that 79.6 percent of subjects possess
efficiency indices in excess of 0.95 for stochastic impatience when correlation aversion is
not imposed. Given that we are in fact testing for the combined properties of lottery
equivalence, impatience and stochastic impatience, this result is as strong as it could be
since (see Table 3) the pass rate of lottery equivalence and impatience is also 79.6 percent.
In other words, every subject in our experiment that can be 0.95-rationalized by a utility
function that obeys lottery equivalence and impatience can also be 0.95-rationalized by
a utility function that obeys lottery equivalence, impatience and stochastic impatience.
A similar result holds when correlation aversion is imposed. We see that 75.7 percent
of subjects have efficiency indices above 0.95 when correlation aversion is imposed in
addition to stochastic impatience. This is as well as the test can perform given the
results on correlation aversion in Table 6.
We can also compare the performance of stochastic impatience with the opposite
property of stochastic patience. We emphasize that we do not consider stochastic pa-
tience to be a plausible global property for a subject’s preference, but if the stochastic
impatience test was too lax or underpowered then we should expect the stochastic pa-
tience test to yield similar results. The pass rates for stochastic patience are reported
in Table 8 along with the McNemar Test’s p-values. We see that there is some evi-
dence that the test has lower power at the the 90% efficiency level; however, there is
a statistically significant difference in performance (at the 5% level) at 99% and 95%
efficiency.
We next compare the efficiency levels for stochastic impatience and stochastic pa-
33When φ is twice differentiable, this is equivalent to φ having a coefficient of relative risk aversion
no higher than 1.
34A similar proposition appears in Dillenberger et al. (2018) where a slightly different definition of
stochastic impatience is used.
27
Table 8: Pass Rates: Stochastic Impatience vs Stochastic Patience
no corr aversion corr aversion
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90 e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Stochastic Impatience 53.4 79.6 91.3 50.5 75.7 90.3
Stochastic Patience 47.6 75.7 90.3 42.7 70.9 88.3
McNemar Test 0.017 0.023 0.159 0.002 0.013 0.159
tience (see Table 9). There is a large block of participants for whom the revealed
preference test is unable to distinguish as being more in line with stochastic impatience
or stochastic patience, which indicates an issue with the power of the test. However, in
those cases where the efficiency levels differ, a large majority behave more in line with
stochastic impatience.
Table 9: Efficiency Levels: Stochastic Impatience vs Stochastic Patience
impatience > patience patience > impatience tie
no corr aversion 13.59 % 2.91 % 83.50 %
corr aversion 14.56 % 1.94 % 83.50 %
Theorem 1 in DeJarnette et al. (2019) shows that if preferences satisfy the indepen-
dence axiom and several other (more innocuous) properties then stochastic impatience
implies RSTL (see Section 2 for a discussion of the Risk Seeking over Time Lotteries
(RSTL) concept). Given the evidence they find against RSTL they suggest either re-
laxing independence or relaxing stochastic impatience.35 As we have seen, a significant
number our subjects behave in accordance with stochastic impatience, which suggests
that relaxing the independence axiom may be the preferred option for these participants.
5.5 Takeaways and Challenges
A sharp picture emerges from the tests in this section. Subjects broadly behave as
though they are maximizing a lottery equivalent and impatient utility function. There
is very little evidence for correlation neutrality, which is a key implication of discounted
expected utility. On the other hand, correlation aversion appears to be a widely-held
property. We also find that the data is broadly consistent with stochastic impatience,
in the sense that most subjects behave in a way that does not contradict this property,
though in this case there could be an issue with the power of our test.36 Overall, as many
as three-quarters of subjects could be classified as maximizing (at the 95% efficiency
35Our experiment does not allow us to test for RSTL as the property has no testable implications
when there are only two time periods.
36More specifically, in the power of our experimental environment to test this property.
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level) a utility function that is lottery equivalent, impatient, correlation averse, and
stochastically impatient (see Table 8).
The evidence put forth provides useful guidance to researchers working on models
of choice over time and risk. The ideal model should allow for (not necessarily require)
correlation aversion and stochastic impatience; it should also be consistent with viola-
tions of RSTL (see DeJarnette et al. (2019)) and perhaps permit some limited degree
of time separability (see Andreoni et al. (2017)).
6 Ordinal Dominance and a Parametric Model
In this section we estimate a parameterization of the Kihlstrom-Mirman model of equa-
tion (13).37 Recall that the Kihlstrom-Mirman model implies that preferences are state
separable and so we first endeavor to test for this property.
6.1 Ordinal Dominance
Suppose we learn that a person prefers to receive 2 dollars today and 2 dollars tomorrow
to receiving 3 dollars today. Can we say anything about this person’s preference over
consumption streams when risk is involved? Perhaps it is reasonable to expect that the
person’s preference will be unchanged if these two consumption streams are mixed with
a third stream; in our notation ((2, 2), (a′′, b′′)) should be preferred to ((3, 0), (a′′, b′′))
for any a′′, b′′ ≥ 0. The notion that a person’s preference over lotteries of consumption
streams ought to respect the same person’s preferences over non-stochastic consumption
streams is the basic idea behind the concept of ordinal dominance as defined in Chew
and Epstein (1990).
Definition 12. A utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies ordinal dominance if U satisfies
lottery equivalence and
U
(
(a, b), (a, b)
)
≥ U
(
(a′, b′), (a′, b′)
)
=⇒ U
(
(a, b), (a′′, b′′)
)
≥ U
(
(a′, b′), (a′′, b′′)
)
for all a, a′, a′′, b, b′, b′′ ∈ R+.
37Note that the Kihlstrom-Mirman model, while useful for estimating separate coefficients for risk
and time preferences, has the drawback that when it satisfies stochastic impatience it also satisfies the
property of risk seeking over time lotteries, a property challenged by experimental findings in DeJarnette
et al. (2019). Notwithstanding this evidence, we still believe the estimation of the parameters of the
Kihlstrom-Mirman model a useful exercise as it allows for comparison to previous studies in which
measures of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution have been estimated.
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Notice that any utility function U also induces a preference over non-stochastic
consumption streams. This preference is represented by the increasing and continuous
function f : R2+ → R, given by
f(a, b) = U((a, b), (a, b)) (19)
Ordinal dominance is equivalent to U being state-separable, i.e., has the form given by
(10), with the sub-utility over consumption streams given by f (as defined by (19)).
(See Proposition 4 in the Appendix.)
The NOQ method does not allow us to test weak separability as such, essentially
because one could not define an underlying preorder on R4+ for which consistency with
that order is equivalent to weak separability. However, we can check for a simple but
striking implication of weak separability.
Suppose an agent’s utility is weakly separable across states, with the form (10), and
that cˆ = (cˆ1, cˆ2) maximizes utility at the price vector pˆ = (pˆ1, pˆ2). Then
cˆ1 maximizes f(c1) in the set {c1 ∈ R
2
+ : pˆ1 · c1 ≤ pˆ1 · cˆ1}.
In other words, if (cˆ1, cˆ2) maximizes overall utility, then cˆ1 must maximize the sub-utility
in state 1, among consumption streams that cost no more than cˆ1: if this were false then
an alternative consumption stream c˜1 is available that raises state 1 sub-utility while
not affecting state 2 sub-utility (since c˜1 costs no more than cˆ1) and hence (cˆ1, cˆ2) is
not overall optimal. By the same argument, cˆ2 maximizes state 2 sub-utility, among all
consumption streams in state 2 that cost no more than cˆ2.
This observation guarantees that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for O to
be rationalized by a utility function that satisfies impatience and is weakly separable
across states is that the dataset Osplit, given by
Osplit =
{
(c11, p
1
1), . . . , (c
N
1 , p
N
1 )
}
∪
{
(c12, p
1
2), . . . , (c
N
2 , p
N
2 )
}
(20)
can be rationalized by some strictly increasing continuous function f : R2+ → R such
that f(a, b) ≥ f(b, a) if a ≥ b. (Osplit is the two-commodity dataset formed by splitting
each observation in O into two and combining them into a new dataset.) The efficiency
index for this property can be straightforwardly calculated using the NOQ method.
We find that 78.6 percent of participants have a efficiency index of at least 0.95. (See
the first row of Table 10.) Since this is based on a test on the reconstructed dataset
Osplit, it does not nest the tests of lottery equivalence and impatience, which are tested
on O. To make the numbers comparable we report on the percent of subjects who have
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an efficiency index for ordinal dominance above 0.95 and have an efficiency index for
lottery equivalence with impatience also above 0.95. So, for example, 72.8 percent of the
subjects pass both necessary tests of ordinal dominance at the 0.95 efficiency threshold.
Overall, these numbers are at least suggestive that a model with ordinal dominance can
describe well the behavior we observe.
Table 10: Ordinal Dominance Test
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
Impatient subutility 65.0 78.6 84.5
Impatient subutility & LE+Impatience 46.6 72.8 83.5
6.2 A Parametric and a Semi-parametric model
In this section we estimate two models. First, we estimate a semi-parametric model
which uses discounted utility with a power felicity function to evaluate timed payouts
within states and a general symmetric aggregator to aggregate utility across states. That
is the bundle c = (c1,1, c1,2, c2,1, c2,2) is evaluated by some utility function U with form
U(c) = G
(
c1−γ1,1 + δc
1−γ
1,2 , c
1−γ
2,1 + δc
1−γ
2,2
)
(21)
where G is some increasing, continuous, and symmetric aggregator function and γ ∈
[0, 1).38 While this model places a lot of structure on how the subject trades off timed
payouts within a state it does not place parametric assumptions on how a subject
evaluates risky payouts and does not even require that risky payouts be evaluated using
expected utility.
Second, we estimate a parametric version of the Kihlstrom-Mirman model (see equa-
tion (13)) where we assume that u and φ are power functions or φ is the log function.
That is, we assume that U can be represented either by
U(c) = 1
1−η
[(
c1−γ1,1 + δc
1−γ
1,2
) 1−η
1−γ +
(
c1−γ2,1 + δc
1−γ
2,2
) 1−η
1−γ
]
(22)
where γ ∈ [0, 1), η ∈ [0,∞)\{1}, and δ ∈ [0, 1] or that
U(c) = ln
(
c1−γ1,1 + δc
1−γ
1,2
)
+ ln
(
c1−γ2,1 + δc
1−γ
2,2
)
(23)
38Our restriction of γ to be less than 1 does not appear to restrict any of our estimates. We make
this restriction to accommodate the many corner solutions observed. Note that when γ > 1 then 01−γ
is either undefined or −∞.
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Since the function φ in (13) is concave in (22) and (23), correlation aversion is embedded
in our specification (see Richard (1975)). Note that our semi-parametric model nests
the parametric model and that the two models coincide for non-risky temporal streams
of consumption.
Recall that stochastic impatience holds if (and, in a sense, only if) the function Φ
(given by (18)) is a convex function. In this case, if U has the form (23), then Φ(z) = z,
and thus stochastic impatience holds; if U has the form (22), then
Φ(z) =
1
(1− η)
exp
(
z(1− η)
(1− γ)
)
,
in which case stochastic impatience is satisfied if η ∈ (0, 1).
The parameters in the model (22) and (23) have natural interpretations. Note that
when risk is absent (c¯1 = c1,1 = c2,1 and c¯1 = c1,2 = c2,2) then preferences over c¯1 and
c¯2 have constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution with parameter 1/γ. Thus, γ
can be thought of as representing the curvature in the time preference utility function.
For the parametric model, when c1,2 = c2,2 = 0 and so we are only considering earlier
period consumption then the preferences take the constant relative risk aversion form
with relative risk aversion coefficient η (or 1 in the case of (23)). Thus, η represents the
curvature of the risk preference utility function.
Table 11: Semi-parametric and Parametric Models
e¯ ≥ 0.99 e¯ ≥ 0.95 e¯ ≥ 0.90
LE and Impatience 55.3 79.6 91.3
Semi-parametric model 24.3 47.6 73.8
Parametric model 12.6 35.9 59.2
We estimate the models by selecting parameters that maximize the efficiency index.
A closely related approach to parametric estimation was first used in Halevy et al.
(2018).39 The distribution of efficiency indices is reported in Table 11. The proportion
exceeding a given threshold are considerably lower than the corresponding numbers
for the nonparametric test, but this is to be expected given that we now estimating
parametric and semi-parametric models. However, note that both parametric and semi-
parametric models generally outperform the non-parametric correlation neutral model.
The median annualized discount rate estimated was 0.67 for the parametric model
and 0.85 for the semi-parametric model. These estimates are higher than that in An-
39The index used by Halevy et al. (2018) is not exactly Afriat’s efficiency index but a related measure
due to Varian (1990). Halevy et al. (2018) compare the results from their estimation approach with
the one obtained by minimizing the sum of square differences and found that their method performs
better. The data in that case consists of portfolio decisions involving risk, with no time dimension.
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dreoni and Sprenger (2012b) which was 0.41. However, the upper quartile for the es-
timated discount rate for both models is the complete patience level of 1.0. This may
reflect the fact that the difference between early and late payment (8 weeks) was not
sufficiently long to pick up meaningful discount rates in some subjects. On the other
hand our lower quartile for this parameter is 0.42 for the parametric and 0.35 for the
semi-parametric which are close to the aforementioned rate found by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012b).
The median estimated time curvature γ is 0.10 for the parametric model and 0.08 for
the semi-parametric model. The lower quartile of our participants have an estimated γ
of 0 indicating perfectly linear utility for both models. The top quartile held a moderate
value of 0.25 for the parametric model and 0.23 for the semi-parametric model.
We now turn the estimates of the risk parameter η for the parametric model. The
median estimate was 0.55. This can be compared to a finding of 0.44 found by Choi
et al. (2007) in their experiment run with equiprobable states (but where all payments
were made on the same date). Note that Choi et al. (2007) estimates a rank dependent
utility model that allows for a kink in the utility function at certainty. This may explain
why their estimate of the curvature is lower than ours. Our estimates for the upper
and lower quartiles for the η parameter were 1.0 and 0.35 respectively. 78 out of 103
(or 75.7 percent of subjects) have estimated η no greater than 1 and would thus satisfy
stochastic impatience.
A striking feature in our estimates for the parametric model is that there is almost no
correlation between estimated γ and estimated η. In the DEU model these coefficients
are identical, which would imply a very high positive correlation coefficient; instead we
find that it is −0.043.
Appendix
A.1 Well-behaved preorders and Proposition 1
In the paper we consider preorders defined on the consumption space R4+. Formally, a
binary relation D on R4+ is a subset of R
4
+×R
4
+. We write a D b if (a, b) ∈D. A preorder
refers to a binary relation that is reflexive (a D a for all a) and transitive (a D b and
b D c implies a D c). A preorder is said to be closed if D, considered as a subset of
R
4
+ × R
4
+, is a closed set. The product order ≥ (where c
′ ≥ c if c′ij ≥ cij for i = 1, 2,
j = 1, 2) is a closed preorder.
Given a binary relation D, we can define its transitive closure; this is another binary
relation on R4+, which we shall denote by D
+. By definition, a D+ b if there is a finite
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set of elements cj (for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m) such that a D c1, c1 D c2, and so forth until
cm D b. If D is a reflexive binary relation, then D+ is a preorder.
Given two binary relations D1 and D2, it its union is also a binary relation; we denote
the transitive closure of this union by D1•D2; we simply refer D1•D2 as the transitive
closure of D1 and D2. Note that if D1 and D2 are preorders, its union need not be a
preorder, but its transitive closure will be.
Let ◦ denote the composition between two preorders D1 and D2, so c D1 ◦ D2 c
′ if
there exists c˜ such that c D1 c˜ D2 c
′. Obviously, D1 ◦ D2 is a binary relation, but it
need not be a preorder. A sufficient condition to guarantee that D1 ◦ D2 is a preorder
is that the two preorders D1 and D2 commute, i.e., D1 ◦ D2 = D2 ◦ D1. Note that a
preorder D is composable in the sense of Definition 4 if and only if it commutes with
the ≥ preorder.
The following lemma on composable preorders (see Definition 4) has a completely
straightforward proof which we shall omit.
Lemma 1. If D is a closed and composable preorder then ≥ ◦ D is a closed preorder.
Definition 13. A preorder D on R4+ is well-behaved if it is closed, composable, and
c D c′ implies not c′ > c.
A utility function U : R4+ → R is said to strictly agree (or extend) the preorder D
if U(c′′) ≥ U(c′) whenever c′′ D c′ and U(c′′) > U(c′) whenever c′′ ⊲ c′. Note that this
notion is stronger than simply saying that U agrees with D (see Definition 3). Our proof
of Proposition 1 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let O = {(c1, p1), . . . , (cN , pN)} be a dataset, let D be a well-behaved preorder
and let e < e∗ for e, e∗ ∈ [0, 1]. If O satisfies e∗-GARP-D then there is a utility function
that strictly agrees with D and e-rationalizes O.
Proof. Let e < e∗ and Bn(e) = {c ∈ R4+ : p
n · c ≤ epn · cn}. By Definition 2, the utility
function U that we seek must satisfy U(cn) ≥ U(c) for all c ∈ Bn(e). Since U is strictly
increasing by definition, this is equivalent to U(cn) ≥ U(c) for all c ∈ B¯n(e), where
B¯n(e) = {c ∈ R4+ : p
n · c ≤ 100e or c ≤ cn}. (24)
By Lemma 1, D+=≥ ◦ D is a closed preorder. By Theorem 2 in NOQ, there is a function
U that strictly agrees with D+ and satisfies U(cn) ≥ U(c) for all c ∈ B¯n(e) if the choices
obey a sort of no-cycling condition. This is precisely what we need provided the following
is true: (a) that if U strictly agrees with D+ then it is strictly increasing (and thus a
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true utility function in the sense defined in this paper) and strictly agrees with D; (b)
the no-cycling condition in NOQ, when specialized to our context, is satisfied.
We first establish (a). Since U strictly agrees with D+, U(c′′) ≥ U(c′) if c′′ > c′ or
c′′ ⊲ c′, and U(c′′) = U(c′) only if c′ D+ c′′ (here c′′ ⊲ c′ means c′′ D c′ and not c′ D c′′).
The latter condition means there is a c¯ so that c′ ≥ c¯ D c′′. Note that c′ ≥ c¯ D c′′
means not c′′ > c′ (by D being well-behaved). Now, suppose c′′ ⊲ c′. Then we have
c′ ≥ c¯ D c′′ ⊲ c′ where the ≥ cannot be replaced by > without contradicting the fact
that D is well-behaved and so it must be that c′ = c¯ D c′′ ⊲ c′ which is a contradiction.
We conclude that U(c′′) > U(c′) if c′′ > c′ or c′′ ⊲ c′.
We now turn to claim (b). NOQ’s condition is that e-GARP-D holds except that the
revealed preference relations in NOQ are defined differently. We need to show that e∗-
GARP-D guarantees that NOQ’s e-GARP-D holds. In NOQ, cn is said to be e-revealed
preferred to cm if there is c˜ such that c˜ ∈ B¯n(e) and c˜ D+ cm, and cn is strictly e-revealed
preferred to cm if c˜ can be chosen such that c˜ ⊲+ cm. Let us denote NOQ’s revealed
preference relations by D⋆e and ⊲
⋆
e .
It is easy to see that cn D∗e∗ c
m if and only if cn D⋆e∗ c
m and so cn D⋆e c
m implies
cn D∗e∗ c
m. It can also be shown easily that cn ⊲∗e∗ c
m implies cn ⊲⋆e∗ c
m. However,
cn ⊲⋆e∗ c
m does not imply cn ⊲∗e∗ c
m. Yet, it is the case that cn ⊲⋆e c
m implies cn ⊲∗e∗ c
m
which will be used to establish (b). Let us prove this claim. Suppose there exists
c˜ ∈ B¯n(e) so that c˜ ⊲+ cm. By the composable property of D this means there exists
c¯ D cm so that c¯ ∈ B¯n(e). This is equivalent to c¯ D cm and
epn · cn ≥ pn · c¯ or cn ≥ c¯
Since e∗ > e, we obtain cn ⊲∗e∗ c
m. Now, suppose the data violate e∗-GARP-D with the
D∗e∗ revealed preference relation. From what we have established about D
⋆
e , it follows
that e-GARP-D is violated for the D⋆e revealed preference relation. Thus, e
∗-GARP-D
in the sense of Definition 8 implies e-GARP-D in NOQ’s sense.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that if the dataset O can be rationalized by a
utility function U that agrees with D then the data will satisfy e-GARP-D. So, let U
be a utility function that agrees with D and rationalizes O at efficiency level e. Define
B¯n(e) by (24). If cn D∗e c
m, then by definition there is c¯ ∈ B¯n(e) such that c¯ D cm.
This implies that U(cn) ≥ U(c¯) ≥ U(cm). If cn ⊲∗e c
m then we have, in addition, that
U(cn) > U(c¯). It follows from this that e-GARP-D holds. Thus
sup
{
e ∈ [0, 1] : O satisfies e-GARP- D
}
≥ sup
{
e ∈ [0, 1] : O is e-rationalizable- D
}
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We must now establish the “≤” inequality part of the proof. Suppose e∗ is the
supremum value of all e so that O satisfies e-GARP-D. Lemma 2 shows that for any
e < e∗ we may find a utility function U that strictly agrees with D and rationalizes
O at efficiency level e. As any U that strictly agrees with D also agrees with D, the
supremum over all e such that O is e-rationalizable-D must be weakly greater than e∗.
This establishes the “≤” part of the proof.
A.2 Testing Properties Jointly
Let D1•D2 be the transitive closure of the preorders D1 and D2. Suppose we would like
to know if there is a utility function U that agrees with both D1 and D2 and rationalizes
the choices of a participant at efficiency level e. This is clearly equivalent to asking if the
choices are e-rationalizable-(D1•D2). The following property, possessed by all preorders
considered in this paper, makes it possible to test this condition.
Definition 14. A preorder D is an arranging preorder if (c¯1, c¯2, c¯3, c¯4) D (c1, c2, c3, c4)
implies c¯k ∈ {c1, c2, c3, c4} for each k.
Lemma 3. If D1 and D2 are composable and arranging preorders, then D1 •D2 is a
composable and arranging preorder.
Proof. Clearly D1 •D2 is arranging. Suppose c ≥ ◦ (D1 •D2) c
′. Then it must be the
case that c ≥ ◦ D1 ◦ D2 ◦ D1 ◦ D2 . . . D1 ◦ D2 c
′. By applying the composable property
repeatedly, we see c (D1•D2) ◦ ≥ c
′.
Proposition 2. Suppose D1 and D2 are well-behaved and arranging preorders and sup-
pose the following property holds: c (D1•D2) c
′ implies not c′ > c. Then D1•D2 is a
well-behaved and arranging preorder.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we see that D1•D2 is composable and arranging. So, to show that
D1•D2 is well-behaved we must show that it is closed.
For a binary relation D and integer K let DK denote the binary relation formed by
composing D with itself K times. As D1 and D2 are arranging it must be the case that
there is a K so that D1•D2 =
(
D2 ◦ D1
)K
. Thus, it suffices to show for two closed
and arranging preorders D1 and D2 that D2 ◦ D1 is closed. Suppose we have a sequence
ck → c and c
′
k → c
′ so that ck D2 ◦ D1 c
′
k for each k. So, there exists a sequence c¯k so
that ck D2 c¯k D1 c
′
k. We may assume that c¯k → c¯ (or at least we could create such a
subsequence). As D1 and D2 are closed we see c D2 c¯ D1 c
′.
In order to check if a dataset is consistent with two properties (such as lottery equiv-
alence and impatience) jointly, we would need to apply Proposition 1 to the preorder
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that is the transitive closure of two preorders. In this situation, Proposition 2 is useful
because it spells out the condition under which the transitive closure of well-behaved
and arranging preorders is also well-behaved and arranging.
A.3 Our menagerie of preorders
Except for the elementary results relying on Afriat’s Theorem in Section 5.1, all the
results in Section 5 rely on applications of Proposition 1, with different preorders chosen
for different tests. We know that a utility function satisfies lottery equivalence if and
only if it agrees with DLE and impatience if and only if it agrees with DI . Given these,
there are obvious analogous preorders DTN and DP that characterize time neutrality
and patience. Other properties studied in Section 5 can be characterized in a similar
way. The following claims are easy to check:
(1) A utility function satisfies correlation neutrality if and only if it agrees with DCN ,
where DCN is defined as follows: for all a, b, a
′, and b′ ≥ 0, we have ((a, b), (a′, b′)) DCN
((a′, b), (a, b′)), ((a, b), (a′, b′)) DCN (a, b
′), (a′, b)), and ((a, b), (a′, b′)) DCN ((a
′, b′), (a, b)).
(2) A utility function satisfies correlation aversion if and only if it agrees with DLE and
with DCA, where DCA is defined as follows: if a ≥ a
′ and b ≥ b′, then ((a′, b), (a, b′)) DCA
((a, b), (a′, b′)). The correlation loving property can be characterized by requiring the
utility function to agree with DLE and with DCL, where the latter is defined as follows:
c′ DCL c
′′ if c′′ DCA c
′.
(3) A utility function satisfies stochastic impatience if and only if it agrees with DLE and
with DSI , where DSI is defined as follows: for all d
′, d′′, d ≤ b ≤ a where d = max(d′, d′′),
we have ((a, d), (d, b)) DSI ((b, d
′), (d′′, a)). A utility function satisfies stochastic patience
if it agrees with DLE and with DSP , with the latter defined as follows: for all d
′, d′′,
d ≤ b ≤ a where d = max(d′, d′′), we have ((b, d), (d, a)) DSP ((a, d
′), (d′′, b)).
It is straightforward to check that every preorder we consider, i.e., every preorder in
the set
{DLE,DI ,DTN ,DP ,DCN ,DCA,DCL,DSI ,DSP}
is well-behaved and arranging. Thus by Proposition 2, the transitive closure of the union
of any subset of these preorders is also well-behaved and arranging. For example, in
Section 5.3, when we tested correlation aversion, we maintained lottery equivalence and
impatience as background assumptions. A utility function will have these properties if
and only if it agrees with the preorder D = DLE•DI•DCA. This preorder is again well-
behaved. Thus, according to Proposition 1, we can calculate the efficiency index for the
joint { lottery equivalence + impatience + correlation aversion } property by checking
e-GARP according to D.
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A.4 Implementing the Tests
Here we discuss how to actually test if the behavior of a subject satisfies e-GARP-D. We
shall focus on the case where we seek to test e-GARP-D for someD=D1•D2 however our
method shall easily generalize to the case of combiningK preorders, D=D1•D2•. . .•DK .
We shall suppose that the preorders D1 and D2 are well-behaved and arranging, so
that for any c the sets ID1(c) and ID2(c) are finite and easy to compute.
Here is a procedure which will check for e-GARP-D.
Procedure.
Step 1. For each m calculate the set {c ∈ R4+ : c D c
m}.
Step 2. For each n and m determine if cn D∗e c
m.
Step 3. Determine if there is a sequence n1, . . . , nK so that c
n1 D∗e
cn2 D∗e . . . D
∗
e c
nK and cnK ⊲∗e c
n1
Step 3 in the Procedure can be accomplished using Warshall’s algorithm (an algo-
rithm for computing the transitive closure of a graph.) So, the challenge lies in Steps 1
and 2. To accomplish Step 1 we shall construct a sequence of sets
V0, V1,1, V1,2, V2,1, V2,2, V3,1, V3,2, V4,1, V4,2 . . .
whose elements are in R4+.
40 Let V0 = {c
m} and let V1,1 = {c ∈ R
4
+ : c D1 c¯, where c¯ ∈
V0}. Let V1,2 = {c ∈ R
4
+ : c D2 c¯, where c¯ ∈ V1,1}. And, for k > 1 let
Vk,1 = {c ∈ R
4
+ : c D1 c¯, where c¯ ∈ Vk−1,2}, Vk,2 = {c ∈ R
4
+ : c D2 c¯, where c¯ ∈ Vk,1}
Each of these sets is computable since ID1(cm) and ID2(cm) can be computed. Because
D is arranging there will be a k > 1 so that Vk,2 = Vk−1,2. It is easy to show that
Vk,2 = {c ∈ R
4
+ : c D c
m} and so we have constructed the desired set.
Once Step 1 is completed Step 2 is easy. Merely, consider each bundle c¯ ∈ {c ∈ R4+ :
c D cm} and consider if epn · cn ≥ pn · c¯. If the answer is “yes” for any c¯ then cn D∗e c
m
and otherwise it is not the case that cn D∗e c
m.
A.5 Separability and Correlation Aversion
Here we discuss the connection between correlation aversion and the separable structures
on preferences. Let X = (X0, X1, . . . , XT ) denote a T + 1 dimensional random vector
40The V stands for “visited.”
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over some finite sample space with S elements. Let us write X1, . . . , XS for the S
non-risky temporal streams of consumption. Xs is the consumption stream realized,
over T + 1 periods, should state s occur (so, Xs ∈ R
T+1
+ ). A utility function U is
state-separable if X is awarded utility
U(X) = FS
(
GS(X1), . . . , GS(XS)
)
for some increasing aggregator function FS and increasing sub-utility function GS. We
say that U is time-separable if X is awarded utility
U(X) = FT
(
GT (X
0), . . . , GT (X
T )
)
for some increasing aggregator function FT and increasing sub-utility functionGT (whose
domain consists of the random variables X t). Note that the DEU model is both state-
separable and time-separable while a utility function that allows for correlation aversion
cannot be time-separable.
A discussion found in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015),
and Andreoni et al. (2017) concerns whether utility should be time-separable or state-
separable. Andreoni et al. (2017) observe that with the time-separable formulation, an
agent’s preference over lotteries that pay out in period t are unaffected by the presence
of lotteries that pay out independently in some other time period t′ > t; they refer to
this property as common future risk invariance (CFRI). Andreoni et al. (2017) find some
support for this behavior in their experiment.
It is in fact possible to reconcile correlation aversion with a restricted version of
time-separability. For example, suppose that an agent has the model
U(X) = −E
[
T∏
t=0
exp
(
−δtu(X t)
)]
This function41 is obviously state-separable and it is not difficult to check that it obeys
correlation aversion (when states are equiprobable), so it could potentially explain the
behavior typically displayed by subjects in our experiment. On the other hand, the
model is also time-separable when X0, . . . , XT are independent (which follows from the
fact that E[Z1Z2] = E[Z1]E[Z2] when Z1 and Z2 are independent random variables),
and thus the agent could also display CFRI.
41A similar functional form can be found in Richard (1975).
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A.6 Stochastic Impatience
Proposition 3. Suppose that U has the form of (13), where φ and u are both strictly
increasing and u(0) = 0 (so u(r) > 0 for all r > 0). Then U displays stochastic
impatience if Φ as defined by (18) is a convex function. Conversely, if Φ is not a convex
function, then there is a strictly increasing and concave function u, with u(0) = 0, such
that U with the form (13) violates stochastic dominance.
The proof of this result requires the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose φ : R++ → R is an increasing function. For any β ≥ 0, let
Φβ(z) = φ(exp(z) + β). Then Φβ is a convex function if Φ(z) = φ(exp(z)) is a convex
function of z.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any z′′ > z′ and x > 0,
Φβ(z
′′ + x)− Φβ(z
′ + x) ≥ Φβ(z
′′)− Φβ(z
′).
Note that Φβ(z
′′ + x)− Φβ(z
′ + x) = Φ(ln(exp(z′′ + x) + β))− Φ(ln(exp(z′ + x) + β)).
Clearly, ln(exp(z′ + x) + β)) ≥ ln(exp(z′) + β) and
ln(exp(z′′ + x) + β))− ln(exp(z′ + x) + β)
= ln
(
exp(z′′) +
β
exp(x)
)
−ln
(
exp(z′) +
β
exp(x)
)
≥ ln(exp(z′′)+β))−ln(exp(z′)+β),
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the log function. Therefore, we obtain,
since Φ is convex and increasing,
Φ(ln(exp(z′′+x)+β))−Φ(ln(exp(z′+x)+β)) ≥ Φ(ln(exp(z′′)+β))−Φ(ln(exp(z′)+β))
which is the inequality we want.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose U has the form ((13)) and Φ is convex. We need to
show that for all a ≥ b ≥ d
U
(
(a, d), (d, b)
)
≥ U
(
(b, d), (d, a)
)
(25)
This is trivially true if b = d, so we assume that b > d. Let β = u(d) + δu(d). Plugging
in the representation (13) into (25) we obtain
φ
(
u(a)−u(d)+β
)
+φ
(
δ(u(b)−u(d))+β
)
≥ φ
(
u(b)−u(d)+β
)
+φ
(
δ(u(a)−u(d))+β
)
(26)
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Equivalently,
Φβ
(
ln(u(a)− u(d))
)
− Φβ
(
ln(δ) + ln(u(a)− u(d))
)
≥
Φβ
(
ln(u(b)− u(d))
)
− Φβ
(
ln(δ) + ln(u(b)− u(d))
)
(27)
This clearly holds if Φβ is convex, which it is by Lemma 4 since β ≥ 0.
If Φ is not convex, then there is v′′ > v′ and w > 0 such that
Φ(v′′)− Φ(v′′ − w) < Φ(v′)− Φ(v′ − w).
Re-arranging this gives
φ(exp(v′′)) + φ(exp(v′) exp(−w)) < φ(exp(v′)) + φ(exp(v′′) exp(−w)). (28)
Let u : R+ → R be any strictly increasing and concave function such that u(0) = 0,
u(x′) = exp(v′), u(x′′) = exp(v′′), and δ = exp (−w) (which will be a number in (0, 1))
for some x′′ > x′ > 0. (Clearly, such a function u exists.) Then (28) gives
φ(u(x′′) + δu(0)) + φ(u(0) + δu(x′)) < φ(u(x′) + δu(0)) + φ(u(0) + δu(x′′)),
which is a violation of stochastic impatience.
A.7 Ordinal Dominance
Proposition 4. If the utility function U : R4+ → R satisfies ordinal dominance, then
it can be expressed in the weakly separable form (10), where f is given by (19) and G
is increasing, continuous, and symmetric. Conversely, if U has the form (10), where f
is increasing and continuous and G is increasing, continuous, and symmetric, then U
satisfies ordinal dominance.
Proof. Suppose U satisfies ordinal dominance. Let f : R2+ → R be defined by (19).
Since f is continuous and strictly increasing, its range R(f) = {f(a, b) : (a, b) ∈ R2+}
coincides with {f(z, z) : z ∈ R+}. The function G : R(r)→ R is defined by
G(f(a, a), f(b, b)) = U((a, a), (b, b))
for all a, b ∈ R+. To verify that this definition is consistent note that f is one-to-one on
the restricted domain of points of the form (z, z) ∈ R2+. Let us verify that (10) holds. Let
((a, b), (a′, b′)) ∈ R4+ be an arbitrary bundle. By the fact that f is continuous and increas-
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ing there exists d and d′ so that f(a, b) = f(d, d) and f(a′, b′) = f(d′, d′). As U satisfies
ordinal dominance we have U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = U((d, d), (a′, b′)) = U((d, d), (d′, d′)). Fi-
nally, we see from our definition of G that U((a, b), (a′, b′)) = G(f(a, b), (a′, b′)) which
confirms that U has a weakly separable representation.
Suppose U has a representation of the form in (10) where f is increasing and con-
tinuous and G is increasing, continuous, and symmetric. We prove that U satisfies
ordinal dominance. The fact that G is symmetric ensures that U satisfies lottery equiv-
alence. Next, suppose we have U((a, b), (a, b)) ≥ U((a′, b′), (a′, b′)) for some a, a′, b, b′.
As f and g are increasing we obtain f(a, b) ≥ f(a′, b′). Let a′′ and b′′ be non-negative
numbers; the fact that g and f are increasing guarantees that U((a, b), (a′′, b′′)) =
G(f(a, b), f(a′′, b′′)) ≥ G(f(a′, b′), f(a′′, b′′)) = U((a′, b′), (a′′, b′′)) as required.
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Online Appendix: Experimental Instructions 
This is an experiment on decision-making. Research foundations have provided funds for 
conducting this research. Your payoffs will depend partly on your decisions and partly on 
chance. It will not depend on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. Please 
pay careful attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money is at stake. 
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your payoffs will be kept 
strictly confidential. In order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices 
to any other participant. Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. If you have 
any questions, please raise your hand to ask the experimenters at any time. 
The entire experiment should be completed within an hour. At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid privately. At this time, you will receive 10 dollars as a participation fee. The 
payment will be delivered to you in two times: 5 dollars 7 days later (26/6/2015) and 5 
dollars 63 days later (21/08/2015). Details of how you will make decisions and receive 
payments will be provided below. 
During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of dollars. Your 
payoffs will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated at the end of the experiment 
into dollars at the rate of 5 Tokens = 1 Dollar. 
 
Part I Decision Task 
In the first part of the experiment, you will participate in 41 independent decision problems 
that share a common form. Here we describe in details the process that will be repeated in all 
decision tasks. In each decision task you will be asked to allocate 100 tokens among different 
accounts. There are four accounts 1Y , 2Y , 3Y  and 4Y . 
  7 days later 63 days later 
Head 1 1p Y  2 2p Y  
Tail 3 3p Y  4 4p Y  
You allocate 100 tokens for 1Y , 2Y , 3Y  and 4Y . You can allocate any amount between 0 and 
100 (including 0 and 100) to each account, and the amounts in four accounts must sum up to 
100. This Decision Table means that you toss a coin: if it is Head, you will receive 1 1p Y
tokens 7 days later and 2 2p Y  tokens 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive 3 3p Y
tokens 7 days later and 4 4p Y  tokens 63 days later. The factors 1p , 2p , 3p  and 4p may vary 
for different Decision Tables. 
Example. Please allocate 100 tokens in the following Decision Table. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head 1______ 2   ______ 
Tail 3   ______ 4   ______ 
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Suppose you make the following decision. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head 1 ___25___ 2   ___25___ 
Tail 3   ___25___ 4   ___25___ 
It means that you will receive 25 (1 X 25) tokens 7 days later and 50 (2 X 25)tokens 63 days 
later if the coin toss is Head; and you will receive 75 (3 X 25) tokens 7 days later and 100 (4 
X25)tokens 63 days later if the coin toss is Tail. 
Suppose you make the following decision. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head 1 ___0___ 2   ___0___ 
Tail 3   ___50___ 4   ___50___ 
It means that you will receive 0 (1 X 0) tokens 7 days later and 0 (2 X 0)tokens 63 days later 
if the coin toss is Head; and you will receive 150 (3 X 50) tokens 7 days later and 200 (4 
X50)tokens 63 days later if the coin toss is Tail. 
Below is a screen shot that you will see for you to enter your choice. 
After you enter your choice, you press the “calculate” button, the computer program will help 
you calculate the earnings in each account as follows. 
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If you are sure about your decision, you can press the “submit” button to go to the next 
decision. If you are not sure about your decision, you can change the numbers and calculate 
again. 
 
Part II Decision Task 
In the second part of the experiment, you will participate in 11 independent decision 
problems where there are two accounts 1Y  and 2Y as shown below. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head/Tail 1 1p Y  2 2p Y  
In this case, you allocate 100 tokens for 1Y and 2Y . This Decision Table means that: you will 
receive 1 1p Y tokens 7 days later and 2 2p Y  tokens 63 days later regardless of the result of 
the coin toss. In other words, you receive the tokens for sure. 
Similarly, below is a screen shot that you will see for you to enter your choice. 
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After you enter your choice, you press the “calculate” button, the computer program will help 
you calculate the earnings in each account as follows. 
If you are sure about your decision, you can press the “submit” button to go to the next 
decision. If you are not sure about your decision, you can change the numbers and calculate 
again. 
Earning 
Your earnings in the experiment are determined as follows. At the end of the experiment, we 
will randomly select one decision from each participant to carry out (that is, 1 out of 52). The 
round selected depends solely upon chance. For each participant, it is equally likely that any 
round will be chosen. If the round selected is from Part I, your payment in two time points 
will be determined by a coin tossed by you and by your choice in that round. If the round 
selected is from Part II, your payment in two time points will be determined by your choice in 
that round. 
At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Each token will be 
worth $0.2 (5 Tokens = $1). Your final earnings in the experiment will be your earnings 
realized by a coin toss in the round selected plus the $10 show-up fee ($5 in each of the two 
time points). 
IMPORTANT: We will sign you two post-dated cheques with the specified dates (7 days 
later and 63 days later) at the end of today’s experiment. Under Singapore banking practices, 
a post-dated cheque can be cashed only on or within 6 months of the specified date. It is very 
IMPORTANT that you do not try to cash before the date of the cheque, since you will not be 
able to get the money, and it will also incur a $40 loss for the experimenter. 
 
Exercises 
In order to make sure that you understand the decision making problem, we would like to 
complete the following exercises. After everyone finishes the exercise, we will explain the 
answers. 
Exercise 1: Suppose you make the following decision. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
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Head 1 ___25___ 2   ___25___ 
Tail 3   ___25___ 4   ___25___ 
 
It means that you toss a coin: if it is Head, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later. 
In terms of money, if it is Head; you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and ______+5 
dollars 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and 
______+5 dollars 63 days later. 
Exercise 2: Suppose you make the following decision. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head 1 ___25___ 1.5   ___30___ 
Tail 0.5   ___20___ 1   ___25___ 
 
It means that you toss a coin: if it is Head, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later. 
In terms of money, if it is Head; you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and ______+5 
dollars 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and 
______+5 dollars 63 days later. 
 
Exercise 3: Suppose you make the following decision. 
  7 days later  63 days later  
Head/Tail 1 ___20___ 0.5   ___80___ 
 
It means that you toss a coin: if it is Head, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______ tokens 7 days later and 
______ tokens 63 days later. 
In terms of money, if it is Head; you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and ______+5 
dollars 63 days later; if it is Tail, you will receive ______+5 dollars 7days later and 
______+5 dollars 63 days later. 
